By Ritwik Choudhury
The One Nation, One Election (ONOE) Bill, formally known as the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, is one of the most sweeping electoral reforms ever proposed in India. It aims to synchronize elections for the Lok Sabha and all State Assemblies, ostensibly to reduce election-related expenses, streamline governance, and minimize political disruptions caused by frequent polls.
While the proposal is framed as an efficiency-driven reform, its implications go beyond logistics and cost-saving measures. The Bill requires significant constitutional amendments and introduces changes that could alter the balance of power between the Centre and the states, limit governance flexibility, and impact voter engagement at both national and state levels.
At the heart of ONOE is the introduction of Article 82A, which mandates that no state can hold elections independently once the ONOE framework is implemented. However, ensuring simultaneous elections requires more than just this addition—it necessitates amendments to multiple provisions that currently define India’s electoral process.
Article 83(2) and Article 172(1), which provide for a fixed five-year tenure for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, would need modifications to accommodate ONOE’s core principle: that all elections should be held in a synchronized manner. The most notable shift is that if a state government collapses mid-term, fresh elections will be held, but the newly elected government will only serve the remaining period of the five-year cycle.
This is a major deviation from the current system, where a dissolved Assembly results in a full five-year mandate. The rigidity of the ONOE model means states will no longer have the flexibility to reset their governance cycle based on political changes, creating a scenario where short-lived governments may struggle to implement long-term policies and electoral expenses may increase in the manifold.
Additionally, the amendment’s language suggests a fundamental restructuring of how electoral schedules are determined, effectively removing the ability of states to conduct independent elections—a stark contrast to the existing federal structure, where states retain significant autonomy over their electoral timelines.
Elections are more than just a voting exercise; they define governance priorities at different levels. State elections, when held separately, allow voters to focus on local governance, regional leadership, and issues unique to each state—agriculture in Punjab, industrial growth in Gujarat, water-sharing disputes in Karnataka. They ensure that state governments are held accountable for their specific policies, separate from the Centre.
ONOE disrupts this distinction by merging national and state elections into a single, high-stakes political event. National leaders and national campaigns will inevitably dominate the electoral discourse, leaving state-specific issues struggling for attention. This shift will alter voting behaviour, pushing state elections to become an extension of national trends rather than an independent political process.
Over time, regional parties, which often act as crucial representatives of local aspirations, could find themselves at a disadvantage against larger national parties that have greater media presence and financial resources. This would weaken political diversity, centralizing electoral competition and reducing the space for regionally focused governance. Critics argue that this dilution of state-specific electoral issues could lead to a homogenization of Indian politics, reducing the space for regional voices that have historically played a critical role in India's democratic framework. Moreover, political homogeneity may find itself incompatible in a culturally heterogenous nation like ours.
The Election Commission of India (ECI) has long advocated for electoral reforms to ensure free and fair elections. ONOE aligns with this goal by reducing frequent disruptions due to multiple elections. However, one of the most overlooked consequences of ONOE is its impact on the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).
Currently, the MCC is enforced only in specific states where elections are scheduled, preventing ruling governments from announcing policies that could influence voter sentiment. Under ONOE, the MCC would have to be implemented nationwide for an extended period, covering both the Centre and all State Governments simultaneously.
While this measure is intended to prevent misuse of government machinery for electoral advantage, it could also paralyze governance for months especially when implemented on a nation-wide scale. Infrastructure projects could be stalled, welfare schemes put on hold, and major policy decisions delayed—all in the name of electoral neutrality.
This raises a critical question: can governance be sacrificed for the sake of uniform elections? If the MCC, originally a short-term safeguard, extends into a prolonged administrative freeze, it could hamper governance rather than protect democracy.
Even under the staggered election system, conducting free and fair elections across India is a monumental logistical challenge. Managing security, voter access, and electoral integrity across a country of 1.4 billion people requires extensive planning and coordination.